The impact of a hospital electronic prescribing and medication administration system on medication administration safety: an observational study by Jheeta, S & Franklin, BD
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
The impact of a hospital electronic
prescribing and medication administration
system on medication administration
safety: an observational study
Seetal Jheeta1* and Bryony Dean Franklin1,2
Abstract
Background: The aim of the study was to explore the impact of the implementation of an electronic prescribing
and medication administration system (ePA) on the safety of medication administration in an inpatient hospital
setting. Objectives were to compare the prevalence and types of: 1) medication administration errors, and 2)
documentation discrepancies, between a paper and an ePA system. Additionally, we wanted to describe any
observed changes to medication administration practices.
Methods: The study was based on an elderly medicine ward in an English hospital. From December 2014 to June
2015, nurses’ medication administration rounds were observed every 5 days before and after ePA implementation
using an interrupted time-series approach. Medication administration error and documentation discrepancy rates
pre- versus post-ePA were analysed descriptively and chi-squared tests used to test for any difference; segmented
regression analysis was used to determine changes in longitudinal trend.
Results: Observations were made at 15 pre- and 15 post-ePA implementation time-points. Pre-ePA on paper, there
were 18 medication administration errors in 428 opportunities for error (4.2%; 95% confidence interval 2.3–6.1%),
and with ePA there were 18 in 528 (3.4%; 95% confidence interval 1.9–5.0%; p = 0.64). Regarding documentation,
pre-ePA on paper there were 5 discrepancies in 460 observed documentations (1.1%; 95% confidence interval
0.1–2.0%); with ePA there were 18 in 557 (3.2%; 95% confidence interval 1.8–4.7%; p = 0.04). The most
common electronic documentation discrepancy was documentation that a dose had been administered when
it had not. Segmented regression analysis was unable to detect any significant longitudinal changes. Changes
to working practices post-ePA were observed, such as nurses demonstrating less-consistent self-checking
when preparing and administering medications.
Conclusions: Findings suggest no change in medication error rate, although ePA encourages certain types of
errors and mitigates others. There was a statistically significant increase in documentation discrepancies which
is likely to be due to adoption of new working practices with ePA.
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Background
The use of electronic prescribing and administration
(ePA) systems has been shown to significantly improve pa-
tient safety by reducing medication errors [1–4]. Although
ePA has been established in the United States (US) for
some years, its uptake in the United Kingdom (UK) has
been slower; in 2011 only 13% of English hospitals had
ePA across most inpatient areas [5]. Nevertheless, the UK
government is committed to advocating its use more
widely, which is expected to increase considerably [6, 7].
In the UK, medication administration errors (MAEs)
occur in an estimated 5.6% of non-intravenous doses
and 35% of intravenous (IV) doses [8]. Most studies ex-
ploring the impact of introducing ePA have focussed on
prescribing rather than medication administration [1].
Other studies report the impact of bar-code medication
administration technology [9, 10], but the findings are
not applicable to ePA systems where bar-coding is not
utilised. Therefore, the impact of ePA on medication ad-
ministration safety is unclear, both in terms of positive
impact on safety and potential negative unintended con-
sequences [11–13]. Existing UK ePA studies focussing
specifically on medication administration are limited and
report mixed outcomes. One early study observed no
difference in MAE rates with the use of electronic pre-
scribing [14] while in contrast, Fowlie et al. [15] and
Franklin et al. [16] reported reductions in MAEs, with
the benefits in the latter study at least partly attributable
to closed-loop automated dispensing integrated with
ePA. Previous studies have used before-and-after designs
and have not explored the longitudinal effect of ePA on
MAEs following its implementation. A longitudinal time
series approach would address some of the limitations
associated with before-and-after studies, and allow ex-
ploration of the time period required for administration
practices to normalise following ePA implementation.
Our aim was to explore the impact of ePA on the
safety of medication administration in an inpatient hos-
pital setting. Objectives were to measure the prevalence
and types of: 1) MAEs, and 2) medication administration
documentation discrepancies (DD), pre- and post-ePA.
Additionally, we wanted to describe any observed
changes in the medication administration process and
explore any ‘settling in time’ for processes to normalise
post-ePA.
Methods
Setting
We studied an elderly medicine inpatient ward in a large
London teaching hospital. The ward was one of two
wards implementing ePA prior to organisational rollout.
The ward comprised fourteen beds. There were gener-
ally three nurses on the ward. There were four main
medication administration rounds each day, at 8 am,
1 pm, 6 pm and 10 pm. Pre-ePA, prescribers were re-
quired to hand-write details of the drug, dose, route,
date and administration times on a pre-formatted paper
drug-chart for each patient. Nurses used this for instruc-
tion of medication administration and to document
details of doses given (or reason for omission). Paper
drug-charts were generally located at each patient’s bed-
side. Individual bedside lockers stored patients’ own
medication brought from home or dispensed by the hos-
pital for that patient. Ward stock medication was stored
in a lockable metal storage box that could be transported
between patients.
Following implementation of a commercially available
ePA system, prescribers entered medication details elec-
tronically. Nurses viewed the prescribed medications
and documented details of dose administration or omis-
sion electronically; the system did not incorporate bar-
code medication administration technology. Access to
ePA required a secure log-in and password. During
medication administration rounds, nurses wheeled a
portable computer on wheels (COW) between patients.
COWs were either standalone, or with integrated medi-
cation storage drawers. Post-ePA, other wards continued
to use paper drug-charts. Therefore, patients often ar-
rived on the study ward with a paper chart already in
use and medication administration was conducted using
paper until medication orders were transferred to ePA; a
small proportion of post-ePA observations were there-
fore on paper.
Study design
An interrupted time-series approach was used to explore
the longitudinal effect of ePA on MAEs [17]. We
planned to collect data at successive time-points every
five days, including weekdays and weekends, for twelve
time-points pre-ePA and at least twelve post-ePA [17].
This number of time-points is the recommended sample
size for interrupted time-series studies of this nature
[17]; it would also allow time for adjustment to new
working practices and identification of any settling-in
time. Ethics approval was not required; the study was
registered locally as a service evaluation. The study has
been reported according to recommended best practice
for MAE studies [8].
Data collection
At each time-point, one research pharmacist observed
the busiest medication administration round of the day,
which was at 8 am. Generally one nurse was observed at
each time-point, although if a second nurse was still ad-
ministering medication to their patients after the first
had finished, their remaining administrations were also
observed. The researcher observed the preparation and
administration of medication and compared these with
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the prescribed medication to identify MAEs and DDs.
Wherever possible, the researcher viewed medication or-
ders before the dose was administered; when this was
not possible, details of medication administered were re-
corded and checked against the order afterwards. The
researcher tactfully intervened to prevent MAEs likely to
result in harm from reaching the patient. Only regularly
prescribed medications were assessed for omissions as
the researcher was not able to judge the appropriateness
of not administering medication orders prescribed to be
given when required; once only doses were generally
given outside of scheduled drug rounds. Intravenous
medications were excluded as very few were adminis-
tered on the study ward; inclusion of different numbers
of intravenous doses pre- and post-EPA may have con-
founded the results as these are associated with higher
MAE rates [8]. Administration of oxygen and dietary
supplements was also excluded.
Data collection forms were developed and piloted be-
forehand. Field notes were made of any factors that may
have influenced medication administration. Potential
MAEs and DDs were documented and later verified
through discussion with a second researcher.
Data analysis
The MAE rate was calculated as the percentage of op-
portunities for error (OE) with one or more MAE; an
OE could theoretically contain more than one MAE. To
calculate the DD rate, the denominator was the number
of observed documentations of dose administrations or
omissions; for each medication order, there could be a
maximum of one DD. Definitions of MAE, DD and OE
are given in Table 1. Ninety-five percent confidence in-
tervals (CI) were presented for MAE and DD rates.
MAE and DD rates at each time-point were presented
graphically and segmented-regression analysis used to
identify any changes in level and trend post-ePA; chi-
squared tests with Yates’ correction were also used to
test for any differences pre- and post-ePA. Clinical sever-
ity of MAEs was not assessed.
Results
Observations and opportunities for error
Data were collected from December 2014 to June 2015
at 15 time-points pre- and 15 post-ePA. After the first
three time-points, data collection ceased for 4 weeks be-
fore resuming; this was due to temporary uncertainty
around ePA implementation on the ward. Time-series
analysis therefore only includes data collected after the
temporary break (12 time-points pre- and 15 time-
points post-ePA). In practice, data were collected every 3
to 6 days with a mean interval of 5 days. One data col-
lection point during each of the pre- and post-ePA pe-
riods was missed due to the researcher’s unavailability.
There were 86 patient encounters observed pre-ePA
and 86 post-ePA, where each patient had one encounter
with a nurse at each time-point. Pre-ePA, 53 (11%) of
481 doses during observations were not considered OEs,
there were therefore 428 OEs. Post-ePA, 46 (7%) of 643
doses were excluded as OEs, leaving 597 OEs. Of these,
528 (88%) were with ePA and 69 (12%) with paper. Add-
itional file 1 gives reasons for exclusion of doses as OEs.
Prevalence and type of medication administration errors
Table 2 summarises MAE rates pre- and post-ePA; the
researcher informed the nurse of four MAEs, one of
which was pre-ePA and three were post-ePA. No signifi-
cant difference in MAE prevalence was observed post-
ePA. Figure 1 shows MAE rates over time; a segmented
regression analysis did not detect any changes in level or
trend post-ePA.
MAEs observed pre-ePA comprised wrong dose,
wrong drug and omission errors; it was only post-ePA
that errors involving extra dose, wrong route and wrong
pharmaceutical form were observed (Fig. 2). Pre-ePA,
there were 12 OEs concerning oral liquid preparations, 4
(33%) of which were MAEs. Post-ePA, there were 28
Table 1 Definitions
Opportunity for error
The number of opportunities for error (OE) was the denominator used to
determine the MAE rate. An OE was defined as any dose that was prepared
and administered to the patient and could be determined as being correct
or incorrect by the researcher, or a dose that was due for administration but
omitted in error [16]. An administered drug was defined as either the
patient consuming the prepared medication or the prepared medication
being left by the patient’s bedside for self-administration [16]. Medication
doses that were administered unsuccessfully due to the patient being
unable to take the dose or subsequent refusal were also considered
OEs if the researcher could determine preparation and attempted
administration as being correct or incorrect. Each dose was considered to
be one OE.
Medication administration error
Medication administration errors (MAE) were defined as any deviation or
omission from the medication order as stated on the patient’s drug
chart [16]. An omission was defined as a dose of medication that had
not been administered by the time of the next scheduled dose. This
included omission of a dose because the medication was not available
on the ward as well as unintentional omissions. Doses omitted
according to a doctor’s instructions, or if the patient was not on the
ward or refused the medication, were not considered to be OEs. Doses
omitted as a result of a nurse’s clinical judgement were also not
considered OEs. Administration processes that did not adhere to local
hospital policy were not considered MAEs; for example a dose not
administered within two hours of the time for which it was prescribed
was not considered an MAE if it was otherwise correct. Errors prevented
by the observer were included as MAEs although errors prevented by
other healthcare professionals working within their usual roles were not.
Documentation discrepancies
Discrepancies in documentation (DD) occurred when the documented
details of dose administration or omission were different to what
happened in practice as observed by the researcher [16].
Documentation was considered for all medication doses due, including
omissions.
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liquid OEs and no related MAEs. Table 3 describes some
MAEs observed; Additional file 2 presents the full list.
When comparing omissions due to drug unavailability
pre-ePA with the small number of paper-based OEs post-
ePA, there was a higher rate post-ePA. Pre-ePA there were
6 (1.4%) of 428 OEs, and post-ePA (on paper) there were
5 (7.2%) of 69 OEs (p = 0.01; chi-squared test).
Prevalence and types of documentation discrepancies
Pre-ePA there were 460 observed documentations of ad-
ministrations (or omissions), of which 5 (1.1%; CI 0.1–
2.0%) were DDs. Post-ePA, using ePA only, there were 18
(3.2%; CI 1.8–4.7%) DDs of 557 observed documentations
(p = 0.04; chi-squared test). Post-ePA, including both
paper and ePA, there were 19 (3.0%) (CI 1.7–4.4%) DDs of
626 observed documentations (p = 0.05; chi-squared test).
Figure 3 demonstrates DDs over time. Segmented regres-
sion analysis did not detect any change in level or trend.
Pre-ePA, DDs comprised dose not administered and the
administration box left blank (n = 1), and the dose not be-
ing administered although signed to suggest it had been
(n = 5). Post-ePA (ePA only), types of DDs comprised dose
not being administered and the administration box left
blank (n = 2), the dose being administered although the
administration box was not signed (n = 2), and the dose
not being administered although signed to suggest it had
been (n = 14). Additionally post-ePA on paper, there was
one discrepancy observed where the dose was adminis-
tered but the administration box left blank.
Changes to medication administration processes
following ePA implementation
Working practices
Pre-ePA, it was noted that on the ward, nurses systemat-
ically marked the relevant medication administration
box with a ‘dot’ to signify preparing each dose and
Table 2 Medication administration errors observed pre- and post-ePA
Pre-ePA (paper only; 428 OEs) Post-ePA (ePA only; 528 OEs) Post-ePA (ePA and paper; 597 OEs)
n Percentage
(95% CI)
n Percentage
(95% CI)
P valuea n Percentage
(95% CI)
P valueb
Total MAEs 18 4.2% (2.3–6.1) 18 3.4 (1.9–5.0) 0.64 24 4.0% (2.4–5.6) 0.99
MAEs excluding omission due to
unavailability of drug
12 2.8% (1.2–4.4) 11 2.1% (0.9–3.3) 0.61 12 2.0% (0.9–3.1) 0.54
Only MAEs due to unavailability of drug 6 1.4% (0.2–2.5) 7 1.3% (0.3–2.3) 0.86 12 2.0% (0.9–3.1) 0.62
CI confidence interval, OE opportunity for error, MAE medication administration error, n number of errors, ePA electronic prescribing and administration system
a χ2 test for association between pre-ePA and post-ePA (ePA only) MAE rate
b χ2 test for association between pre-ePA and post-ePA (ePA and paper) MAE rate
Fig. 1 Time series graph showing observed medication administration error (MAE) rates and 95% confidence intervals pre-ePA (paper) and post-
ePA (ePA only) (ePA electronic prescribing and administration)
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signed for administration immediately only after the pa-
tient consumed the dose. With ePA, less consistent self-
checking behaviour was observed with some nurses sign-
ing for administration following preparation rather than
patient consumption. Another change observed was that
pre-ePA, nurses collated any drug-charts that had out-
standing jobs, such as to order or retrieve medication,
and dealt with these after the medication round. With
ePA, some nurses dealt with the problem there and then,
others would sign for administration but make a hand-
written list of outstanding jobs to address afterwards.
Response to warnings and alerts
With ePA, nurses were observed acting on electronic
warnings and alerts that they interpreted as an indica-
tion of a prescribing error and subsequently omitted the
dose concerned, which may not have been appropriate.
In one instance a nurse omitted an antibiotic dose at
their discretion with an intention to inform the doctors,
because an alert indicated the prescription had exceeded
the intended duration; this was not included as an MAE.
Another occurred when an alert warned of a duplication
of levothyroxine so the dose was omitted, however the
intended dose alternated every other day and the dupli-
cation was therefore intentional; this was included as an
MAE.
Infrastructure
On some occasions when using ePA, COWs were not
charged and therefore had to remain stationary plugged
into the electricity supply. This meant that nurses would
walk back and forth to the stationary COW or were re-
quired to use two trolleys: a standalone COW plus the
COW with medication storage.
Discussion
The overall MAE rate was similar to previously reported
UK MAE rates [8] with no significant difference follow-
ing introduction of ePA. Findings suggest that ePA en-
courages certain types of MAEs and mitigates others.
DDs increased with ePA, this is likely to be influenced
by the adoption of new working practices.
Medication administration errors
A key advantage of ePA is that it can potentially ensure
inclusion of essential information that may be omitted
on paper, and wrong dose errors caused by ambiguous
handwriting are eliminated [18, 19]. MAEs associated
with misinterpretation of liquid concentrations were ob-
served using paper prescribing, despite there being more
liquid OEs post-ePA. Pre-ePA, local policy stipulated
that liquid formulations should be prescribed by dose
not volume. However using ePA, for many liquids, con-
centration is specified and subsequently doses are
Fig. 2 Types of medication administration errors observed associated with either paper or ePA (ePA electronic prescribing and administration)
Jheeta and Franklin BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:547 Page 5 of 10
prescribed in volume. This negates any potential volume
miscalculations by nurses when preparing the dose.
Additionally, MAEs occurred on paper where prescribers
amended a dose on multiple occasions, leading to misin-
terpretation of the intended dose. When changing doses
on ePA, a new medication order is generated therefore
eliminating this problem. Although re-ordering on ePA
in this way has been reported to cause unintentional
order duplications [12, 20], this was only observed once
in the present study and was noticed by the nurse so did
not lead to an MAE. Nevertheless, adjusting doses
caused one MAE. This occurred when a nurse purposely
delayed a dose of fludrocortisone until the end of the
round; on returning to the ePA chart, they could no lon-
ger see the outstanding dose, so it was omitted. This was
because in the interim, it had been re-prescribed at a
higher dose, but to commence the following day. Similar
types of MAEs were introduced when transferring from
paper to ePA, particularly omissions due to the unavail-
ability of the drug. Nurses would temporarily omit a
dose with the intention to administer it when it was sup-
plied from pharmacy. However, if in the interim the
paper chart was transcribed to ePA, the dose was
often omitted until the next day. Similar MAEs have
previously been reported with a hybrid of two systems
[11, 13, 21]. Piloting and phased roll-out of ePA may
contribute to such errors due to simultaneous use of
ePA and paper systems within the organisation.
Findings suggest ePA may introduce new types of
MAEs involving extra dose, wrong route and wrong
pharmaceutical formulation. When these errors oc-
curred, nurses had generally not noticed additional rele-
vant information, such as specification of modified
release, or instructions to administer eye drops by an al-
ternative route. A reason why similar errors were not
observed on paper may be because of the visual cues
Table 3 Examples of medication administration errors observed
Paper or ePA
prescribing
Error type (definitions based
on existing work [30])
Drug(s) involved in error Field notes for additional context where relevant
Pre-ePA
(paper)
Wrong dose 5 mg of morphine sulphate solution
administered instead of 2.5 mg
The prescribed dose was “2.5 mg”. The nurse erroneously
drew 2.5 ml of 10 mg/5mlsolution instead of 1.25 ml into an
oral syringe. The quantity in the syringe was checked by a
second nurse and a student nurse was also observing.
Pre-ePA
(paper)
Wrong dose 312.5 mg of co-amoxiclav liquid
administered instead of 625 mg
The nurse originally read the prescribed dose as “625 mg”.
Then they read the concentration of co-amoxiclav on the
bottle (250 mg/62.5 mg in 5 ml) and concluded that the
prescribed dose actually read 62.5 mg as stated on the bottle
of co-amoxiclav, not 625 mg. They informed the student
nurse that the dose correlates to the smaller of the two
numbers stated on the co-amoxiclav bottle (62.5 mg). Therefore
5 ml was prepared, the researcher intervened.
Pre-ePA
(paper)
Wrong dose 12.5 mg of spironolactone
administered instead of 25 mg
The original prescribed dose was 12.5 mg which had then
been amended by the prescriber by scoring through the dose
and re-writing “25 mg” next to the old dose. The rewritten dose
was potentially unclear and interpreted as 12.5 mg.
Post-ePA
(paper)
Unintentional omission Ramipril 2.5 mg The nurse did not notice this drug was written on a new
drug chart, the administration box was left blank. The paper
chart was then transcribed to ePA and the next dose was
prescribed for the following morning, so the dose was
omitted.
Post-ePA
(ePA)
Wrong dose 25 mg of metolozone administered
instead of 2.5 mg
The nurse prepared five 5 mg tablets instead of cutting one
tablet in half. The researcher intervened. The nurse stated that
they read the dose specifically as they were not familiar with
the drug. They could not see the decimal place on the
computer screen and therefore read 25 mg as the dose.
Post-ePA
(ePA)
Wrong form Venlafaxine 75 mg modified release
administered instead of immediate
release
The medication administered was the patient’s own, therefore
it is likely that the prescription was incorrect although the
nurse did not notice this.
Post-ePA
(ePA)
Wrong route Furosemide 40 mg oral administered
instead of intravenous dose
The nurse prepared oral furosemide for administration. The
researcher intervened and the nurse stated that they had not
noticed the route of administration.
Post-ePA
(ePA)
Wrong route Atropine 1% eye drops administered
in eyes instead of sublingually
The eye drops were being used off-label and prescribed via
sublingual route although administered in each eye. The
researcher intervened and the nurse stated they had not
noticed the additional instructions specifying the route of
administration. The researcher informed the nurse after
administration to the eye.
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that a paper chart allows, such as use of coloured ink or
highlighting key information. These cues are lost using
ePA [11]. While many ePA systems utilise visually no-
ticeable warnings and alerts, these are largely targeted at
prescribers [22]. While ePA can potentially improve clar-
ity and completeness of medication orders, the small on-
screen computerised text can be misinterpreted by cer-
tain users, as observed when a nurse misread a dose of
metolozone as 25 mg instead of the intended 2.5 mg.
Documentation discrepancies
DDs in which a dose had not been administered but was
signed to suggest it had been were more common with
ePA. These were often due to a nurse signing following
preparation, and if administration was subsequently un-
successful due to the patient declining medication or be-
ing unable to take the dose, documentation not being
amended. A previous study has reported similar in-
creases in DD with ePA [16]. In our study, nurses using
paper charts demonstrated a self-checking procedure
that facilitated signing only once a patient consumed a
dose. The ePA documentation process does not allow
for an equivalent resilience strategy. This suggests the de-
sign of electronic systems is based on stated policy rather
than consideration of actual practice or the more nuanced
functions afforded by paper drug-charts [23, 24]. While
documentation can be amended retrospectively with ePA,
it may be perceived to be time-consuming or tedious
[12, 21]; it was not possible via a simple “undo” func-
tion. Nevertheless, as the system did facilitate a two-
person check for narcotics, it may be possible to
develop a two-stage process to document preparation
and administration separately. In the present study,
nurses also perceived the need to document adminis-
tration on time and perhaps felt uncomfortable that
exact times of administration were recorded with
ePA. Indeed as ePA introduces a more robust audit
trail and associated monitoring, nurses may perceive
their practice to be under scrutiny, a concept previ-
ously described as “technovigilance” [25]. This may
explain why nurses would sign for administration
when a patient or drug was unavailable and make a
note to complete administration later. This may also
encourage the well-reported paper-persistence that oc-
curs with ePA [26].
Strengths and limitations
The main strength is that the observational methods
used are considered to be reliable and accurate to detect
MAEs [27]. Additionally, data were collected throughout
Fig. 3 Time series graph showing observed documentation discrepancy (DD) rates and 95% confidence intervals pre-ePA (paper) and post-ePA (ePA
only) (ePA electronic prescribing and administration)
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the week to ensure findings represented practice on both
weekdays and weekends. Although it is possible that
nurses changed their practice because of the presence of
an observer, this has not been shown to affect MAE
rates [28]. Improved reliability could have been achieved
by introducing a second observer and testing for inter-
rater reliability; however, this could have been perceived
as threatening for the nurses, and was not feasible within
the resources available. The generalisability of findings is
limited because we studied one ward where a relatively
narrow range of medications was used. It is likely that in
other environments, different MAEs may be observed. It
is also possible that findings reflect the nature of a pilot
implementation phase, where there may be additional
monitoring, assistance and scrutiny of the new system
on pilot wards.
The main limitation was the relatively small sample
size. Because of the ward setting and patient group,
fewer than the recommended 100 OEs were recorded at
each time-point [17]; subsequently it may not have been
possible to detect any longitudinal changes or ‘settling in
time’ using interrupted time-series analysis. A post-hoc
power calculation based on a two group comparison be-
tween paper and ePA, using alpha of 0.05 and beta of
0.8, suggests it would have only been possible to detect a
change in MAE rate from 4.2% to 1.3% or 8.7%. Further-
more, wide variability in individual nurses’ practices and
adaptability to ePA was observed, as documented previ-
ously [29], and our small sample size precluded formal
exploration of clustering of error rates by nurse. Time-
intervals were not always equal and two data points were
missed, further limiting our time-series analysis. Al-
though it was not possible to detect changes over time,
descriptive comparisons of pre- and post-ePA identified
a difference in the types of MAEs, an important finding
when considering ePA implementation.
Recommendations for practice
ePA systems should be designed to ensure essential in-
formation is easily noticed and interpreted at the point
of medication administration. Similarly, ePA functional-
ity should reflect working practices rather than stated
policy, such as for the self-checking process whereby
nurses differentiated between dose preparation and con-
sumption on paper drug-charts. Additionally, amending
ePA documentation retrospectively should be made
more streamlined to aid nurses to accurately document
administration.
Hospital organisations and healthcare professionals
should be aware of the potential for errors when doses
are adjusted on ePA, and omissions associated with hy-
brid paper and electronic systems. The period of such
hybrid environments during piloting and phased roll-out
should be minimised to reduce the risk of potentially
dangerous errors associated with patients transferring
between wards using paper and ePA.
Recommendations for future research
Larger studies exploring the effect of ePA on MAEs
should be conducted in different ward environments
where a wider range of drugs, including intravenous
medications, are used; analysis of MAE severity should
also be considered. Future studies should also document
error rates by nurse to allow analysis to take into ac-
count any possible clustering of error rates. It would be
of value to simultaneously explore prescribing errors,
particularly as these can lead to administration errors. In
the present study, there were three MAEs observed with
ePA that were likely to have been caused by prescribing
errors, although a sensitivity analysis excluding these as
OEs and MAEs did not affect our conclusions. To fur-
ther explore the extent to which MAEs are attributable
to ePA, the causes of MAEs should be explicitly ex-
plored in parallel with future quantitative work.
Conclusion
Findings from this small study suggest no difference in
the prevalence of MAEs between paper and electronic
prescribing, although there may be new types of MAEs
introduced with ePA. The completeness of medication
orders on ePA eliminates ambiguities around intended
doses, however MAEs occurred when essential instruc-
tions to aid accurate preparation and administration of
medication was not displayed clearly. A statistically sig-
nificant increase in documentation discrepancies post-
ePA was largely due to new working practices and
nurses not amending documentation as needed. To im-
prove medication administration safety, ePA systems
should be designed to reflect actual working practices
rather than stated policy. There should also be an in-
creased awareness of the types of MAEs and DD associ-
ated with ePA and with hybrid paper and electronic
systems.
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